Writing in 1999, legal ethics scholar Brad Wendel noted that “[v]ery little empirical work has been done on the moral decision making of lawyers.” Indeed, since the mid-1990s, few empirical studies have attempted to explore how attorneys deliberate about ethical dilemmas they encounter in their practice. Moreover, while past research has explored some of the ethical issues confronting lawyers practicing in certain specific areas of practice, no published data exists probing the moral mind of health care lawyers. As signaled by (...) the creation of a regular column “devoted to ethical issues arising in the practice of health law” in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, the time to address the empirical gap in the professional ethics literature is now. Accordingly, this article presents data collected from 120 health care lawyers. Presenting this population with a number of hypothetical scenarios relating to how they would respond when confronting an ethical dilemma without an obvious solution or when facing a situation in which their personal values were in tension with their professional obligations, this article represents a first step toward better understanding how lawyers who practice in health care settings understand and resolve the moral discomfort they encounter in their professional lives. (shrink)

The empirical literature exploring lawyers and their moral decision making is limited despite the “crisis” of unethical and unprofessional behavior in the bar that has been well documented for over a decade. In particular we are unaware of any empirical studies that investigate the moral landscape of the health lawyer’s practice. In an effort to address this gap in the literature, an interdisciplinary team of researchers at Vanderbilt University designed an empirical study to gather preliminary evidence regarding the moral reasoning (...) of health care attorneys. The primary research question was how health lawyers respond when they encounter ethical or moral dilemmas in their practice for which the law fails to offer a bright-line solution. In exploring this question, we sought to understand better what motivations or influences guide action when health lawyers confront ethical quandaries, and whether there are specific differences, e.g., gender, experience, or religiosity, that are associated with specific responses to situations testing ethical or moral boundaries. (shrink)

Coupledom and notions of intimacy and family formation with one committed partner are hallmarks of family and relationship science. Recent national surveys in the United States and Canada have found that consensually non-monogamous relationships are common, though prevalence of specific types of consensual non-monogamy are unknown. The present research draws on a United States Census based quota sample of single adults to estimate the prevalence of desire for, familiarity with, and engagement in polyamory—a distinct type of consensually non-monogamous relationship where (...) people typically engage in romantic love and sexual intimacy with multiple partners. Results show that 1 out of 6 people desire to engage in polyamory, and 1 out of 9 people have engaged in polyamory at some point during their life. Approximately 1 out of 15 people reported that they knew someone who has been or is currently engaged in polyamory. Among participants who were not personally interested in polyamory, 1 out of 7 indicated that they respect people who engage in polyamory. Few sociodemographic correlates emerged; no differences in prevalence were found based on political affiliation, income, religion, geographic region, or race/ethnicity. Sexual minorities, men, and younger adults reported greater desire to engage in polyamory. Men and people with lower education backgrounds were more likely to have previously engaged in polyamory. Given that emotional and sexual intimacy is an important part of most people’s lives, understanding the varied ways in which people navigate their intimate lives is critical for the fields of relationship, sexuality, and family science. (shrink)

Noncompliance exasperates health care professionals, leaves them worrying about the effective outcome of medical care, and results in noncompliant patients being labelled as 'difficult' or 'troublesome'. It is suggested that professionals who label a patient as noncompliant are following convenient paternalistic principles rather than considering the impact of a prescribed regimen on an individual patient. In this paper, the author considers autonomy and respect to be foremost in patient care. Further, compliance does not necessarily indicate that both professional and patient (...) have developed a collaborative understanding relationship. Noncompliance is described as a lack of recognition by the health care professional of the meaning of the regimen to the patient. Treatment interventions will be most successful when the patient participates in the prescription. Without acknowledgement of the patient as an equal partner, and listening to his or her narrative, care will be, at best, paternalistic. Les soignants peuvent devenir exasperes par les malades qui n'acquiescent pas à leur traitement. Cela laisse les soignants souciant des résultats de leurs soins et abouti à ce que les malades sont qualifiés de difficiles ou insoumis. On propose ici que le personnel qui traite les malades d'insoumis suit des principes paternalistes plutôt que de considérer les suites des regimes prescrits pour les particuliers. Dans cet article l'auteur considère l'autonomie et le respet comme primordiaux pour les soins. L'acqiescement ne veut pas toujours dire que malades et infirmiers/ères ont développés des rapports collaborateurs. Le refus d'acquiescer est aperçu comme un manque de reconnaissance par la personne soignante de la significance du traitement médical du malade. Les interventions réussissent le mieux quant les malades participent à leurs soins. Si l'on n'accepte pas les malades comme partenaires en écoutant leurs récits, les soins sont au plus du paternalisme. Die Ablehnung der verordneten Behandlung durch die Patienten kann das Pflege personal zur Verzweiflung bringen und den Ausgang der Behandlung in Frage stellen und führt dazu, die Patienten als schwierig oder problematisch einzustrafen. Hier wird die Ansicht vertreten, dass das Pflegepersonal, das Patienten als unkooperativ oder ablehnend bezeichnet, einem paternalistischen Prinzip folgt und nicht an die Wirkung denkt, die die verschriebene Behandlung auf einzelne Patienten hat. In diesem Artikel bezeichnet die Autorin die Selstbestimmung der Patienten und den Respekt ihnen gegenüber als das Wichtigste in der Krankenpflege. Fügsamkeit deutet nicht unbedingt auf eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen Patienten und Pflegenden hin. Zuwiderhandlung der Patienten wird als Mangel an Verständnis von Seiten des Pflegepersonals gesehen, das die Bedeutung, die die Behandlung für Patienten hat, nicht einzuschatzen weiss. Die Behandlung wird nur dann den grösstmöglichen Erfolg bringen, wenn die Patienten daran teilnehmen. Wenn Patienten nicht als gleichberechtigte Partner angesehen werden, deren Meinungen gehört und respektiert werden, ist die Pflege höchstens patemalistisch. (shrink)

Exception from Informed Consent (EFIC) regulations detail specific circumstances in which Institutional Review Boards (IRB) can approve studies where obtaining informed consent is not possible prior to subject enrollment.To better understand how IRB members evaluate community consultation (CC) and public disclosure (PD) processes and results, semi-structured interviews of EFIC-experienced IRB members were conducted and analyzed using thematic analysis.Interviews with 11 IRB members revealed similar approaches to reviewing EFIC studies. Most use summaries of CC activities to determine community members’ attitudes; none (...) reported using specific criteria nor recalled any CC reviews that resulted in modifications to or denials of EFIC studies. Most interviewees thought metrics based on Community VOICES’s domains (feasibility, participant selection, quality of communication, community perceptions, investigator/IRB perceptions) would be helpful.IRB members had similar experiences and concerns about reviewing EFIC studies. Development of metrics to assess CC processes may be useful to IRBs reviewing EFIC studies. (shrink)

Firearm violence in the United States produces over 36,000 deaths and 74,000 sustained firearm-related injuries yearly. The paper describes the burden of firearm violence with emphasis on the disproportionate burden on children, racial/ethnic minorities, women and the healthcare system. Second, this paper identifies factors that could mitigate the burden of firearm violence by applying a blend of key ethical theories to support population level interventions and recommendations that may restrict individual rights. Such recommendations can further support targeted research to inform (...) and implement interventions, policies and laws related to firearm access and use, in order to significantly reduce the burden of firearm violence on individuals, health care systems, vulnerable populations and society-at-large. By incorporating a blended public health ethics to address firearm violence, we propose a balance between societal obligations and individual rights and privileges. (shrink)

The global pandemic needs to mark a turning point for the peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand. How can we make sure that our culturally diverse nation charts an equitable and sustainable path through and beyond this new world? In a less affluent future, how can we ensure that all New Zealanders have fair access to opportunities? One challenge is to preserve the sense of common purpose so critical to protecting each other in the face of Covid-19. How can we centre (...) what we have learnt about resilience within Māori and wider Pacific communities in our reforms? How can public understanding of Covid-19 science create a platform for the future social valuing of expertise? How can we ensure that the impact of Covid-19 in New Zealand results in a more sustainable, and inclusive workforce–for instance by expanding our perceptions of the value of our workers through promoting digital inclusion? To meet these challenges, we must reimagine our existing traditions of thought, breathing new life into perennial concepts and debates. Our paper indicates some of the ways that Philosophy is central to this collective reimagining, highlighting solutions to be found across our rich philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Although introns in 5′‐ and 3′‐untranslated regions (UTRs) are found in many protein coding genes, rarely are they considered distinctive entities with specific functions. Indeed, mammalian transcripts with 3′‐UTR introns are often assumed nonfunctional because they are subject to elimination by nonsense‐mediated decay (NMD). Nonetheless, recent findings indicate that 5′‐ and 3′‐UTR intron status is of significant functional consequence for the regulation of mammalian genes. Therefore these features should be ignored no longer.

In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive (...) class='Hi'>Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective-interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore-paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches. (shrink)

G. E. Moore observed that to assert, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' would be 'absurd'. Over half a century later, such sayings continue to perplex philosophers. In the definitive treatment of the famous paradox, Green and Williams explain its history and relevance and present new essays by leading thinkers in the area.

Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this (...) will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. I show that the translation involved is much trickier than might at first appear. It is simplistic to think that Moorean absurdity in assertion is always a subsidiary product of the absurdity in belief, even when the absurdity is conceived as irrationality. Instead we should aim for explanations of Moorean absurdity in assertion and in belief that are independent even if related, while bearing in mind that some forms of irrationality may be forms of absurdity even if not conversely. (shrink)

Is there a Moore ’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss (...) putative examples of rational and irrational desires, suggesting that there are norms of rational desire. Then I examine David Wall’s groundbreaking argument that Moorean desires are always unreasonable. Next I show against this that there are rational as well as irrational Moorean desires. Those that are irrational are also absurd, although there seem to be absurd desires that are not irrational. I conclude that certain norms of rational desire should be rejected. (shrink)

This document includes the first English translation of Georg Trakl’s recently discovered poem “Hölderlin,” along with two commentaries on it. Moore’s commentary highlights the significance of this poem for continental philosophy (especially Heidegger and Derrida) by focusing on the German word for madness, Wahnsinn, which Trakl (mis)spells with three n’s. Moore argues that this word resists the sense of gentle gathering that Heidegger locates in Trakl’s poetry and therefore in Hölderlin and his madness. Trakl is, rather, a precursor (...) to Paul Celan. Moore’s commentary concludes with a new translation of Celan’s own poetic response to Hölderlin, titled “Tübingen, Jänner.” Weichselbaum’s commentary discusses the background for the genesis and discovery of Trakl’s “Hölderlin.” Weichselbaum compares this poem with other moments in which Trakl alludes to Hölderlin. (shrink)

I supply an argument for Evans's principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore's paradoxes.

It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine accepting this claim. Then you are committed to saying ‘It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining’. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to claim or assert, yet what you say might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to assert something about yourself (...) that might be true of you? This is Moore’s paradox as it occurs in speech. What is the source of the absurdity? And why does it strike us that a contradiction is somehow at work when there is no contradiction in the content of what is asserted? In Section 2, I describe Moore’s formulation of the paradox and evaluate his own solutions. In Section 3, I discuss Wittgenstein’s inf luence in solving the paradox. In Section 4, I discuss Shoemaker’s priority thesis that once the absurdity in belief has been explained, then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. In Section 5, I discuss work on omissive and commissive Moore-paradoxical assertions, i.e. those of the forms p & I don’t believe that p and p & I believe that not-p. In Section 6, I discuss work on assertions of the form p & I don’t know that p. (shrink)

It is raining but you don’t believe that it is raining. Imagine silently accepting this claim. Then you believe both that it is raining and that you don’t believe that it is raining. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to believe,yet what you believe might be true. Itmight be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to believe something about yourself that might be (...) true of you? This is Moore’s paradox as it occurs in thought. Solving the paradox consists in explaining why such beliefs are absurd. I give a survey of some of the main explanations. I largely deal with explanations of the absurdity of ‘omissive’ beliefs with contents of the form p & I don’t believe that p and of ‘commissive beliefs’ with contents of the form p & I believe that not-p as well as beliefs with contents of the form p & I don’t know that p. (shrink)

Discussions of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes; not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different explanations.

I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.

G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give (...) a better explanation of the absurdity both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections. (shrink)

Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be (...) a form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must explain why Moorean beliefs are irrational yet, according to Chan, their grammatical third-person transpositions are not, even though the same proposition is believed. But the solution can only explain this asymmetry by relying on a formulation of the ground of the irrationality of Moorean beliefs that presupposes precisely such asymmetry. I reply that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the irrationality that the contents of Moorean beliefs be restricted to the grammatical first-person. What has to be explained is rather that such grammatical non-first-person transpositions sometimes, but not always, result in the disappearance of irrationality. Describing this phenomenon requires the grammatical first-person/non-first person distinction. The pragmatic solution explains the phenomenon once it is formulated in de se terms. But the grammatical first-person/non-first-person distinction is independent of, and a fortiori, different from, the de se /non- de se distinction presupposed by pragmatic solution, although both involve the first person broadly construed. Therefore the pragmatic solution is not circular. Building on the work of Green and Williams I also distinguish between the irrationality of Moorean beliefs and their absurdity. I argue that while all irrational Moorean beliefs are absurd, some Moorean beliefs are absurd but not irrational. I explain this absurdity in a way that is not circular either. (shrink)

Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, (...) to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition. (shrink)

I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’. I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate and rebut three objections to my argument.

Supersaturated hcp f -Zr alloys containing 22-28 at.% N were prepared by nitriding sheets of Zr in an atmosphere of high-purity N 2 , followed by homogenization under high-purity Ar gas. Quenching and isothermal ageing of the alloys for various times between 500 and 650°C resulted in precipitation of a metastable phase, rather than the equilibrium phase ZrN. This investigation focused on determining the structure, orientation relationship, habit plane, morphology, growth kinetics and atomic growth mechanism of this non-equilibrium precipitate using (...) transmission electron microscopy imaging and diffraction techniques, high-resolution transmission electron microscopy, electron-energy-loss spectroscopy and various simulation programs. The precipitate, which was arbitrarily designated the  phase, has a monoclinic Bravais lattice. Its lattice parameters are a = 0.32 nm, b = 0.60 nm, c = 0.56 nm, f = g = 90° and n = 121.5°. Its orientation relationship with the f matrix is $$ _alpha /mskip-2/ _xiquad adquad [01bar 10] _alpha /mskip-2/ [001]_xi, $$ and the average habit plane of lenticularly shaped precipitates is $_alpha$ . Determination of the structure and other aspects of the phase transformation are discussed. (shrink)

Sidney Shoemaker has given an influential explanation of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief in terms of conscious belief. Here I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.

In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. I (...) then took (3) to mean (EP) Whatever justifies me in believing that p justifies me in believing that I believe that p.1 Now suppose that I am justified in believing anything of the omissive Mooreparadoxical form: (Om) p and I do not believe that p. Then I am justified in believing the first conjunct. So by (EP) I am justified in believing that I believe that p. But since I am also justified in believing the second conjunct, I am justified in believing that I do not believe that p. I claimed that this is impossible, because anything that justifies me in believing that something is the case renders me unjustified in believing that it is not the case. This syllogism is plausible from an externalist view of justification, according to which circumstances such as seeming to see rain under normal perceptual conditions, justify me in believing that it is raining. In support of (1), if my apparent perceptions of rain are reliably connected with rain, so as to justify me in thinking that it is raining, they also tend to make me believe that it is raining. In support of (2), my apparent perceptions of rain are also reliably connected with my coming to believe that it is raining. However, Anthony Brueckner (2006) argues that (1) and (EP) are both false once justification is thought of evidentially. Against (EP), he claims that my evidence that p is not evidence that I believe that p unless I possess the evidence, in the sense that I believe it and were I to believe that p on its basis. (shrink)

Little research has explored the perceptions of military medical providers in the deployed environment and how their perceptions may change over time across an extended military conflict. To our knowledge, no studies have examined military medical providers’ opinions on readiness for their roles in the post-9/11 contingency operations. What has been published indicates that, during the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military medical providers often deployed with little notice and minimal formal training. The present report examines data obtained from multiple (...) cohorts of military medical providers (N = 321) deployed to Iraq between 2005 and 2009. Despite varying degrees of support from the U.S. public, our findings indicate that U.S. Air Force military medical providers’ support for the people of Iraq, their belief in the mission, and their ability to influence change did not vary with time. (shrink)

What explanation is there of the source of my justification for my beliefs about my beliefs that respects the fact that I am normally the best authority on them? Moore's paradox demands an explanation of the absurdity of believing or asserting possible truths of the forms p but I don't believe that p or p but I believe that not-p. I argue for Evans principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I (...) believe that p. This helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs and also shows that it is impossible for a Moorean belief to be justified. I then explain the absurdity of Moorean assertion while avoiding the messy notion of 'expressing belief' yet acknowledging Shoemaker’s constraint that if I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p. (shrink)

In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Mooreparadoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Mooreparadoxical belief. (...) The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defective- interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Mooreparadoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches. (shrink)